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THE INTERNET REVOLUTION
Raymond Shih Ray Kut

I. INTRODUCTION

I am honored to write this essay on the state of Internet law to
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Santa Clara Computer
and High Technology Law Journal. It is fitting and appropriate that an
entire section of this special issue is devoted to addressing the legal
and policy challenges posed by a technology that did not exist at the
time the journal was founded. Throughout history technological
innovation has played and continues to play a major role in the
development of law, most often by creating what Justice Cardozo
described as the interstices or the space between existing legal rules
and decisions.'
Correspondingly, law's response influences what
technologies are developed and how they are used. The importance
of a forum for exploring and discussing these issues cannot be
overstated.
When this journal was founded, society was struggling with the
then emerging technology of the VCR. A year later, in 1984, the
Supreme Court paved the way for a product that is now ubiquitous,
one that has provided the public with a valuable means for obtaining
and experiencing information and created new markets and generated
great wealth for the consumer electronic and entertainment
industries.2 Today, we are struggling with the social, political, and
legal implications of a world increasingly interlinked and mediated by
computer technology, and lawmakers are constantly struggling with
the legal implications of this new technology. 3 In this context, the
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1. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 114, 129 (Yale
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its own subject matter because it represents the study of the regulation of information in a world
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history of the VCR is more than an example of the integral
relationship between law and technology; it is a cautionary tale as
well. While it appears in hindsight that the Supreme Court reached
the "correct" decision regarding the VCR, at the time, the great
weight of scholarly authority was to the contrary. 4 So how does one
evaluate Internet law when one recognizes that no one, let alone
lawyers, is prescient and capable of accurately predicting the impact
of new technologies? 5 In other words, how does one evaluate the
state of Internet law while the revolution is still occurring?
To engage in this analysis, this essay draws upon the framework
for social revolutions provided by Crane Brinton as a means for
making some preliminary judgments about the current state of
Internet law and for providing guidance going forward.6 Doing so
does not suggest that one can simply map Brinton's anatomy of
revolution directly onto Internet law. There are limitations to the
metaphor and its application to what may be described as a
technological and legal rather than socio-political revolution. Rather,
recognition of the dynamics of revolution provided by Brinton's fever
metaphor and outline of the evolution of revolution are useful
measures for evaluating the state of the law even though if the fit is
not perfect or universal. Moreover, unlike Brinton, I do not claim to
describe without evaluating. In this context, I do not believe that such
detachment is useful let alone possible. The choice of the framework
as well as the examples to which it is applied reflects both conscious
as well as sub-conscious biases and normative judgments.
Nonetheless, this analogy with political revolution is proposed in the
hopes of facilitating a dialogue on the state of Internet law including
whether such a discussion is both possible and meaningful.

II. THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION
In his seminal contribution to the study of revolution, Crane
Brinton analogized socio-political revolutions to fevers. According to
Brinton, revolutions like fevers could be divided roughly into three
stages.7 The first stage involves the initial onset of the illness
4. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
5.

Cf Frank H Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal

F. 207 (arguing that "Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make about
new

technology,

are highly likely to be

false.") at http://www.law.upenn.edu/law6l9/

f2001/weekl 5/future of ecommerce.html
6.

CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION passim (1965).

7.

Id. at 16-17.
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including the conditions that made the system susceptible to the
illness. The second stage is the fever itself, which "works up, not
regularly but with advances and retreats, to a crisis, frequently
accompanied by delirium ... , According to Brinton, this stage
culminates in a reign of terror and virtue after extremists seize power.
The final stage involves convalescence including the breaking of the
fever and is "usually marked by a relapse or two." 9 In providing this
structure, Brinton was not attempting to provide a universal blueprint
for revolution. Rather he was searching for commonalities in four
specific "successful" revolutions: the English, French, Russian, and,
to a lesser extent, American revolutions.' 0 All of these revolutions
already shared certain similarities in that each was made "in the name
of freedom, were all directed against the tyranny of the few and
toward the rule of the many.""
In choosing the metaphor of pathology, Brinton was aware that the
metaphor might be perceived as an implicitly negative view of
revolution. After all: "[N]obody wants a fever. The very word is
full of unpleasant suggestions. Our use of terms borrowed from
pathology is likely, at the very least, to arouse in many readers
to be
sentiments which bar further understanding. We seem
12
damning revolutions by comparing them with a disease."'
According to Brinton, however, this was not his intent.' 3 He
desired to maintain some form of scientific detachment - "to describe
without evaluating.' 4 While recognizing the negative implications of
the metaphor and framework, Brinton was quick to point out the
positive aspects of the fever metaphor as well. While it is often a
condition we want to avoid, we are often better off having survived a
fever. "To develop the metaphor, the fever bums up the wicked
germs, as the revolution destroys wicked people and harmful and
useless institutions."1 5 Consequently, the metaphor should not
influence whether one considers the fever as a positive/desirable or
negative/undesirable force. That conclusion will be made based upon
one's judgment of the underlying goals of the revolution.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. atl7
Id. at 17.
See Id. at 21.
BR1NTON, supra note 6 at 240.
Id. at 18.
Seeld. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 18.
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The same is true for Brinton's corresponding description of the
course of each revolutionary fever. According to Brinton, all of the
revolutions considered in his analysis, "are begun in hope and
moderation, all reach a crisis in a reign of terror, and all end in
something like a dictatorship...,6 Much like the metaphor, what one
thinks of this course will depend upon one's perspective on the
underlying value of the revolution. One might consider the course of
the fever or the path from moderate to extremist to reactionary as
society returning to a desirable equilibrium point with or without
assimilating changes brought about by the revolution. Or, one might
consider these illustrations of revolutions in which the promise of the
revolutions was ultimately undermined.
For the purposes of this essay, the relevant revolution is not
technological that is the innovations in technology that fall under the
broad heading of the Internet. Rather, advances in technology
represent only the first stage of revolution-the necessary precondition and onset of illness for the fever that follows. After all, this
essay is concerned with the state of the law rather than the state of
technology. Accordingly, one may make a preliminary evaluation of
the state of the law by asking descriptively whether we are at the
onset of illness, undergoing the fever, or convalescing. In terms of
analyzing a revolution in the law, the first stage would entail the
recognition of a problem posed by advances in technology. The
second would be exemplified by uncertainty in the formulation and
application of legal rules and principles to the problem. The third
stage could then be characterized by the settling of legal rules and
expectations. Similarly, one may ask the related question of whether
the law is responding to technological change and is in the process of,
or already returned to a state of equilibrium after incorporating or
rejecting changes promised by the revolution. Finally, how one
evaluates the resulting descriptive conclusions or what one might
prescribe going forward will depend upon one's normative evaluation
of and commitment to the promise of the revolution.
III. THE

INTERNET REVOLUTION

In light of the pervasiveness of Internet technologies and
diversity of legal subjects, it should come as no surprise that
current diagnosis is decidedly mixed. In some areas of law,
appear to be convalescing. In others, we are in the middle of

the
the
we
the

16. BRINTON, supra note 6 at 24. Brinton distinguished the American Revolution from
the others because he concluded it did not experience a corresponding reign of terror.
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fever, and in some ways, we are still in the first stage of identifying
whether a problem even exists. To illustrate this point, the following
discusses two examples of the state of Internet law at the micro-level:
personal jurisdiction over websites and copyright liability for file
sharing as well as the macro-level question of whether it makes sense
to even speak in terms of the law of the Internet or Cyberspace.
The case of personal jurisdiction over activities occurring in
cyberspace is arguably one area of law in which the revolution
appears to have played itself out. Considering that online activities
including websites, bulletin boards, and chat rooms appear to occur
both nowhere and everywhere, it is not surprising that the problem of
what jurisdiction or jurisdictions may legitimately regulate such
activities was evident almost immediately. During the second stage
or the fever, positions on this question covered the entire spectrum.
Some concluded that websites were subject to jurisdiction in any
jurisdiction in which they appeared. 17 Still others argued that not only
was it illegitimate for local authorities to regulate activities that occur
in cyberspace, it was not practically possible. 18 And, in a moment of
delirium, it was suggested that whether local authorities may exercise
jurisdiction over a controversy stemming from online activities should
be resolved along a sliding scale based upon the interactivity of online
conduct.' 9 Today, it would appear that we are in a period of
convalescence.
A consensus is developing among courts that
accessibility and interactivity either alone or together are insufficient
to support jurisdiction in a forum. Instead, more and more courts are
choosing to evaluate online activities in the same manner that other
activities are judged by examining whether defendants specifically
direct their activities towards the forum.2 0 In other words, the fact
that it is foreseeable or that a defendant was aware that a passive or
interactive website may be accessed in a particular forum alone is
insufficient to support jurisdiction.
In contrast, the controversy over the legitimacy of Internet file
sharing appears to be in the second stage of revolution. Revisiting
Brinton's words, we appear to be working up, "not regularly but with

17.
1996).

See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.

18.

See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in

Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
20. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th
Cir. 2002).
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advances and retreats, to a crisis, frequently accompanied by
delirium...., 2 1 While online services such as Napster and KaZaA
popularized file sharing, the legal system is in the preliminary stages
of grappling with the question of whether the individuals sharing
these files are violating copyright law. While copyright holders have
experienced some success in litigation against Napster 22 and some
similar services, 23 they suffered a serious defeat in a suit against the
most popular and successful heir to the peer-to-peer market.24
Likewise, while the recording industry recently filed lawsuits against
hundreds of individual file sharers with some of these suits being
settled,25 the fundamental question of whether file sharing is fair use
remains unresolved.26 If the almost unending stream of lawsuits, the
ongoing efforts of the Recording Industry Association of America to
subpoena the identities of individual file sharers from Internet service
providers, and the persistence of file sharing are any indications, we
are in a crisis. Whether file sharers or copyright owners are the ones
suffering from delirium is an altogether different question.
Finally, one area of Internet law that is arguably only in the first
state of revolution is the more general problem of whether it is useful
to treat Internet law as a coherent subject. In the words of Judge
Easterbrook, does the study of Internet law "illuminate the entire
law," or should students merely study Internet questions as they arise
in Torts, Contracts, and Property.27 Ironically, while this was one of
the earliest questions raised, thanks to Judge Easterbrook, we are still
only beginning to explore it and its implications. By connecting the
study of Internet law to the study of the limits of law as a regulator
and the techniques for escaping those limits, Lawrence Lessig has
provided perhaps the most thoughtful and developed response to

22.

BRINTON, supra note 6 at 17.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

23.

In re Aimster Copyright Ligitation, 252 F. Supp.2d 634 (N.D. Il1.2002).

24.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 259 F. Supp.2d 1029.
See, e.g., Amy Harmon and John Schwartz, Music File Sharers Keep Sharing, N. Y.

21.

25.

TIMES, Sep. 19, 2003, at 1; John Schwartz, Recording Industry Warns 204 Before Suing on
Swapping, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at B I.
26.
Compare Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001) (arguing that it is appropriate to grant

copyright owners' control over new markets for their works such as file sharing) with Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERK.

TECH. L. J. 539 (2003) (arguing that file sharing is consistent with the fair use doctrine).
27.

Easterbrook, supranote 5 at 207.
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date.28 In a far less developed and more limited way, I have
suggested Cyberspace law represents the study of the regulation of
information as the law evolves from models of regulation based upon
physicality and the economics of the printing press to one governing
the creation and dissemination of information across computer
networks in which that information is both abundant and easily
manipulated.29 Still others, including this author, have at times left
this question open for students to evaluate even as they study the
subject. 30 Nonetheless, until more research has been done, I, for one,
will withhold final judgment on whether there is a there, there, and
what precisely that may be.
IV. CONCLUSION

It should be readily apparent that this essay is not a complete or
exhaustive survey of the state of Internet law. Instead, it suggests a
framework for conducting such a survey and provides some
illustrations of how that framework may be applied. In large measure
this process is descriptive, and does not discuss the normative
questions raised in the development of Internet law, nor does it
evaluate the state of the law in light of those normative
considerations. For example, this essay suggests that the question of
Internet jurisdiction appears to be in third stage of revolution. This
description does not claim that the developing consensus in that area
is "right," only that it exists. In particular, there are many normative
concerns raised by commentators like David Johnson and David Post
that have not been addressed. Similarly, while much of the doctrinal
uncertainty regarding the ownership of Internet domain names has
been resolved due to scholarship on the subject exemplified by the
fine article from Gayle Weiswasser, 31 following this essay, as well as
Congress' passing of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act of 1999,32 and ICANN's 33 adoption of the Uniform Domain

Names Dispute Resolution Policy, this does not mean that these rules

28.

See generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic

Books 1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse, What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501 (1999).

29.

KU, supranote 3 at 14-15

30.
See, e.g., Id.; BELLIA, ET. AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE at 12-13 (Thomson West 2003).
31.
Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, the Internet, and Trademarks: Infringement in

Cyberspace, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 137 (1997).
32. Codified as 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(d) (2003).
33. ICANN stands for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
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are not subject to criticism of, among other things, the legitimacy of
the process that spawned them. A stable order is not necessarily a just
order. When one considers Brinton's observation that his sample of
democratic revolutions all began in hope and ended in dictatorship,
those who see the promise of a legal revolution ushered in by the
Internet should be vigilant of efforts to co-opt or derail the revolution
and skeptical of stability.
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INTERNET LAW
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